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DCI/IC 74-3504

10 December 1974

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

SUBJECT

The NODIS, EXDIS, LIMDIS, STADIS Problem

1. Purpose:

You asked us at our meeting on 2 Dec 74 to look into the matter of access to State Department controlled distribution messages (NODIS, EXDIS, LIMDIS and STADIS). This memorandum summarizes a quick look at the problem.

2. Discussion:

a. We reviewed the importance, distribution, and access to STATE controlled distribution messages with a variety of key personnel in this building. We contacted the following offices and spoke to these personnel.

Office	Individual Contacted	
NIO/USSR	Asst NIO	25X1
NIO/WesternEurope	Chief	25X1
Director, Political Research/DDI	Dep. Chief Soviet Br.	25X1
Cnief, Office of Current Intelligence	Chief, East Europe and USSR	25X1
Executive Office, DCI	Executive Asst. (NODIS)	25 X 1
Operations Center	Chief	25X1
b. Views of these personnel remessages were similar. Opinion var	garding EXDIS and LIMDIS ied for NODIS. No one in	

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this building knew much about STADIS traffic.

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(1) EXDIS and LIMDIS do not appear to pose problems in this building. NIOs have good access and receive copies with few constraints. There is fixed distribution to other key offices, and additional copies are reproduced fairly routinely. Analysts have access. As an example, the Chief, Soviet Branch, Current Intelligence stated his office received six copies routinely. This he finds adequate. The NIOs said "no problem." said OPR had a mechanical problem on distribution or these messages but this was an internal administrative problem.

(2) STADIS. No one wanted to express a judgment. The system is relatively new and no one was comfortable discussing it. Col. Broadus Bailey, now in POL/MIL at STATE, says STADIS receives fairly wide distribution in that building. He states it is used for unilateral matters such as in developing a STATE position vis-a-vis DoD. He does not consider this traffic of intelligence importance. He says, incidentally, he rarely sees EXDIS traffic and never NODIS.

(3) NODIS. All those interviewed expressed concerns about this traffic. All consider it highly important. Most believe that once NODIS traffic reaches this building it is handled reasonably well. in Mr. Colby's office manages access. She telephones interested principals who then come to her office to read the traffic. NODIS messages are not circulated, copied, or quoted in writing. All but one was forthcoming. Her example, if asks of the people I talked to had access. said Miss that an analyst see the message, believes the system is "an acceptable situation." On the other hand, Chief, Soviet Branch, Current Intelligence says, "the people who need to read it can't." He with access routinely returns to his office, calls in an analyst and parrots what he just read. He considers this unfortunate. It seems that analysts concerned with ambiance, Brezhnev's health, etc., have a definite disadvantage. Chief, Soviet Branch, OPR complained that he alan't have access. He is doing a paper on Brezhnev's visit to Cairo and is not comfortable about what he knows. After I heard his complaints and mentioned them to he has seen NODIS from time to time. Nearly everyone said they wondered and worried about what they didn't see and didn't know. All said they were convinced not all important

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NODIS traffic is coming to Mr. Colby's office. was almost angry. He said he, as NIO/WE had not been kept informed by NODIS traffic regarding Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus matters. He is certain there is much he has not read. He said he read absolutely nothing following Dr. Kissinger's recent visit to Rome.

(4) As you recall, the Director recently considered writing Dr. Kissinger a letter seeking his intervention so as to receive more NODIS traffic. ________ prepared the letter. As part of this initiative, _______ Chief, CIA Operations Center, reviewed the problem with Dr. Kissinger's staff. He concluded that the staff was liberally interpreting the secretary's policy. Indeed, _______ determined that the number of messages received recently had not declined as feared by Mr. Carver and _______ OCI. Dr. Kissinger's staff suggested that if Dr. Kissinger were to get personally involved, he might tighten rather than relax the policy. On this basis Mr. Colby decided not to take the matter up with the secretary at this time. _______ is prepared to brief you further on this matter, if you so desire.

3. Recommendation:

a. ______review this matter from his special perspective when he returns to duty. As a minimum he will be able to describe the STADIS category in a more meaningful way.

- b. Monitor the problem on a continuing basis. In our Washington assessments and trips to overseas posts this question should be an item of special interest.
- c. We not take this up with the Director nor STATE unless the present situation worsens.

Colonel, US Army IC/HUMINT

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cc: PRD

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